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This paper reviews the principal source of India’s wealth distribution statistics, which is 
constituted by the five decennial Reserve Bank of India National Sample Survey 
Organization Surveys on Debt and Investment of 1961-62, 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92, 
and 2002-03. The data available are described, critically appraised, and analyzed to 
present some salient findings in terms of the levels of debt, the levels of asset-holdings 
across the states of the Indian Union and over time, wealth composition, and aspects of 
vertical and horizontal inequality in the distribution of wealth. The centrality of land and 
real estate in the wealth status of India is underlined, and some broad aspects of 
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Amartya Sen (1981: 6) says ‘In understanding general poverty, or regular starvation, or 
outbursts of famines, it is necessary to look at both ownership patterns and exchange 
entitlements, and at the forces that lie behind them.’ At a certain level of abstraction, 
one can discern a formal arithmetical equivalence between shoring up entitlements 
through the entitlement-mapper and shoring them up through altering endowment. The 
equivalence is a feature of the simplification inherent in the abstraction, not of the real 
world. Certain endowments like ‘ability’ are not easily enhanced by transfers, and 
certain entitlement-mappers like relative prices are not easily altered without 
accompanying (‘distortionary’) costs. The precise route to improving entitlements must 
be a function of the specific context at hand. What is clear is that the ownership of 
assets, and their distribution, have a profound impact on the success or failure of 
entitlement; and that, in principle, tangible asset-redistribution is a means to 
entitlement-enhancement for the poor. 
 
That India is a poor country needs hardly to be underlined. This fact, taken together 
with the immediately preceding considerations, suggests that a study of trends and 
magnitudes in the distribution of household wealth should be of crucial relevance and 
interest for a country like India. Apart from this, the sheer size of the country—India 
accounts for nearly a fifth of the world’s population—makes it an important site for the 
study of personal wealth from a global perspective. Additionally, the country has 
witnessed a surge in the growth rate of per capita income in the last decade or so: this 
fact has been widely diagnosed as a reflection of India’s rapid development in the recent 
past, and it is of interest to examine if any of this dynamism is reflected in the evolution 
of India’s household wealth. Furthermore, the decadal household asset surveys available 
for India constitute a remarkably rich source of data, such as are scarcely available in 
most developing countries, and this makes the data a particularly valuable window on 
the structure of asset-holdings in countries at a comparable stage of development. 
 
Surprisingly, though, despite the availability of five decades of survey results—for the 
sixties, the seventies, the eighties, the nineties, and the turn of the millennium—there 
have been few comprehensive descriptive studies of the subject. Two prominent 
exceptions are the work of Divatia (1976) and Vaidyanathan (1993): the former 
analyzed the findings of the Reserve Bank of India’s Rural Debt and Investment 
Surveys of 1961-62 and 1971-72, and the latter extended the coverage to the results of 
the 1981-82 National Sample Survey Organization’s Debt and Investment Survey. In 
the present work, we shall deal with aspects of the 1961-62, 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92 
and 2002-03 surveys: the last is the most recent published survey on the inter-household 
distribution of assets available. 
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It should be clarified at the outset that our concern will be with only a subset of 
household wealth, that constituted by physical and financial assets, leaving out human 
capital. The latter is a quantitatively important component of wealth in richer countries, 
as pointed out by Davies and Shorrocks (2005) in their discussion of the World Bank’s 
(1997) data. In developed countries, wealth in the form of public pension entitlements is 
also significant, though much less so in developing countries. The presence of spatial 
variations in the composition of household wealth suggests that what constitutes 
‘wealth’ is context-specific. Wealth is an important, but also both an incomplete and 
imperfect, indicator of welfare—it is therefore a significant, without being an 
exhaustive, component in a more comprehensive assessment of distributional and 
welfare analysis.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the principal features 
of the data available in the five surveys mentioned earlier. A separate paper by 
Subramanian and Jayaraj (2006) discusses certain difficulties which are encountered in 
the use of these data, and these difficulties are summarized, in a drastically abbreviated 
version, in the present paper—in fact, Section 2 of the present paper is, substantially, a 
reproduction of Sections 1 and 3 of Subramanian and Jayaraj (2006). Subject to these 
qualifications, Section 3 presents some findings from the five surveys, with a particular 
emphasis on the last two (1991-92 and 2002-03) surveys. Section 4 concludes. The 
focus, for the most part, will be on broad trends and magnitudes, on measurement 
issues, and on methodological concerns. 
2  The survey data: a brief description 
In 1951-52 the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) commissioned an All-India Rural Credit 
Survey. This was followed a decade later, in 1961-62, by a more comprehensive All-
India Rural Debt and Investment Survey (AIRDIS), which in this paper will represent 
the first of the five time points, separated by decadal intervals, in our series from 1961-
62 to 2002-03. In 1971-72, the coverage was extended to the country’s urban areas in 
the RBI’s All-India Debt and Investment Survey (though the tabulated results for urban 
India are still (!) not available). The third (1981-82) decennial survey was entrusted by 
the RBI to the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), which also conducted the 
fourth (1991-92) survey on Assets and Liabilities of Rural and Urban Households, and 
the fifth (2002-03) survey on Household Assets and Liabilities in India. (The 2002-03 
survey results have been covered in five volumes, and at the time of this writing—
March 2006—only three of the volumes are available on the NSSO website.) From 
1961-62 to 1991-92, the surveys coincided conveniently with the NSSO’s work on 
landholdings and livestock (NSS Rounds 17, 26, 37 and 48), so that data on 
landholdings, assets, and indebtedness could be canvassed from the same sets of 
households. Despite a similar coincidence of surveys in 2002-03, different sample sets 
of households were resorted to in the two surveys.  
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The surveys were conducted in conformity with a two-stage stratified sampling 
procedure. The first stage units were villages for the rural areas and (where applicable) 
blocks for the urban areas, while the second stage units were households. In 1991-92 
and 2002-03, the sample sizes of households were 36,425 and 91,192 respectively for 
the rural areas, and 20,606 and 52,093 respectively for the urban areas. The estimated 
numbers of households in the two years, for the rural areas, were 116.4 million and 
147.9 million respectively; sample size as a proportion of population was around 0.03 
per cent in 1991-92 and around 0.06 per cent in 2002-03.   
 
In each of the five surveys, and at the level of each state and union territory of the 
country, data are provided on the household distribution of assets in nominal terms. A 
‘household’ is taken to be a group of persons living together and sharing food from a 
common kitchen. A ‘household asset’ is an item owned by the household and 
possessing money value. The ‘valuation’ of physical assets is done at current market, 
sales, or purchase prices, as may be applicable. Households are classified according to 
the value of asset-holdings, and for each size class of holdings information is provided 
on the estimated number of households and the average value of both debt (any claim, 
in cash or in kind, against the household) and assets, for each of eight types of asset—
land, building, livestock and poultry, agricultural machinery, non-farm business 
equipment, all transport equipment, durable household assets, and financial assets (the 
last broken up into shares, deposits and accounts receivable). For each size class and 
each category of asset, information is also available on the proportion of households 
reporting ownership of the asset. 
 
The size classification of households by value of asset-holdings is variable across the 
surveys—a fact which (as noted in Subramanian and Jayaraj 2006) has certain 
implications for the over-time comparability of inequality indices computed from 
grouped data. The numbers of size classes in the 1961-62, 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92 
and 2002-03 surveys are, respectively, seven, eleven, eight, ten and ten; and the size 
class intervals are also variable across the surveys.  
 
The distributional data described above are presented in further disaggregated form 
according to occupational categories—classified broadly into ‘cultivators’ and ‘non-
cultivators’ in the rural areas, and ‘self-employed’ and ‘others’ (or ‘non-self-employed’) 
in the urban areas. Cultivator households are those which operate at least 0.005 acres (or 
0.002 hectares) of land, while households which operate less than 0.005 acres of land 
(and this includes the landless) are designated non-cultivators. Non-cultivators are 
further classified into agricultural labourers, artisans, and the rest, and the 1961-62 and 
1971-72 surveys furnish detailed distributional data for these sub-classifications. Self-
employed persons refer to those engaged in their own farm or non-farm enterprises. 
Both the self-employed and the non-self-employed categories subsume under 
themselves a number of heterogeneous occupations, and in terms of class 4 
differentiation, the rural divide between cultivators and non-cultivators is perhaps 
sharper than the urban divide between the self-employed and the non-self-employed.  
 
Another major group classificatory criterion is that of caste. The 1991-92 survey 
presents distributional data, in both the rural and the urban areas, for a three-fold 
categorization of caste, pertaining to the scheduled tribes, the scheduled castes (so 
designated under Article 39 of the Constitution of India, in reference to the erstwhile 
‘untouchables’), and the ‘others’. In our own empirical exercises (to follow), the 
scheduled castes (SC) and the scheduled tribes (ST) have, often, been aggregated into a 
composite scheduled caste–scheduled tribe (SCST) group. Since data on both caste and 
occupation are available only in the 1991-92 survey, our analysis of horizontal, or 
group-related, distributional issues has been confined to this survey. 
 
For 1991-92, computerized microdata are available at the level of each household. The 
availability of unit-level data is a considerable advantage. Among other things, this 
facilitates an assessment of the distribution of net worth (assets less liabilities), which is 
not possible with the published grouped data, since the classification of households is 
only by asset ownership and not by net worth status. The microdata also facilitate a finer 
partitioning of the population, for example, into caste-cum-occupation categories, than 
is possible with the grouped data. 
 
Each of the surveys carries an enormous amount of detailed information on the 
distribution of assets and indebtedness, and what we have provided above is only a very 
quick and broad description of the salient features of the survey data which, by and 
large, do not suffer to any marked extent from inter-survey variations in definitions and 
concepts, as observed by Vaidyanathan (1993). In Subramanian and Jayaraj (2006), 
certain difficulties that are likely to be faced by a researcher in using these data are 
appraised. We would like to suggest that, apart from being of possible independent 
interest, the paper just cited is an important guide to the caution with which findings 
based on the survey data must be interpreted. The paper also highlights certain 
contextual features of the Indian economy which are important for an understanding of 
the overall background against which the analysis of household wealth distribution is 
done in this paper.  
 
A very quick summary of Subramanian and Jayaraj (2006) would highlight the 
following features of the data. First, it is likely that the extent of debt, particularly in the 
more recent surveys, is under-estimated. Second, it is probable that the extent of asset-
ownership, especially for the larger size classes, has been progressively under-
estimated, and that this is particularly true with respect to the reporting of land and real 
estate (both extent and value), and gold. The suggestion, then, is that there could be an 
increasing under-estimation of inequality in the distribution of both assets and net worth 
as inferred from the survey results. Finally, computerized microdata at the individual 
household level are currently available only for 1991-92: their availability for all the 5 
surveys conducted so far would be an essential part of any constructive suggestion for 
improvements in India’s household wealth database. 
3  Some findings from the survey data 
3.1 Introduction 
In this section, we shall present some major findings from an analysis of the survey data 
for 1961-62, 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2002-03, in respect of magnitudes and 
trends for indebtedness, levels and composition of wealth, and inequalities in the 
distribution of wealth. The robustness of these findings is, of course, a function of the 
reliability of the data on which they are based, and a number of caveats in this regard—
which will not be systematically repeated here—are available in the paper by 
Subramanian and Jayaraj (2006). Despite these difficulties, it is expected that the 
findings will reveal certain broad patterns and relationships which it would be difficult 
to reject out of hand.   
3.2 Debt 
Indebtedness can be captured in two indicators, the incidence measure (or proportion of 
households reporting indebtedness) and the debt-asset ratio. At the all-India rural level, 
the data (see Table 1) suggest that in respect of both indicators there has been a decline 
over time in indebtedness (though the 1981-82 survey report itself acknowledges that 
the incidence figure for this year is suspiciously low). While the incidence of 
indebtedness appears to be lower, the debt-asset ratio is generally higher for the urban 
areas than for the rural, as revealed by the data for 1981-82 and 1991-92. The burden of 
debt is typically higher for the asset-poor households than for the asset-rich ones, as 
reflected in a monotonically declining debt-asset ratio with the size class of asset 
ownership (see Table 2, which presents data for India, rural and urban combined, in 
2002-03).  
 
As noted in Subramanian and Jayaraj (2006), there is reason to believe that the extent of 
indebtedness is under-stated in the surveys. This issue is explored by Rao and Tripathi 
(2001) and Satyasai (2002), with particular reference to the 1981-82 and 1991-92 
surveys. Rao and Tripathi point out that, to render the 1991-92 estimate comparable 
with the 1981-82 estimate, ‘current liabilities’ would have to be added to ‘cash loans’ in 
order to obtain a complete picture of the debt magnitude. When this is done, they report 
that the incidence of indebtedness in 1991 increases to 32 per cent in the rural areas and 
to 24.8 per cent in the urban areas—both substantially higher than the corresponding 
figures for 1981-82. Furthermore, they find that the extent of institutional credit, as 
available from figures provided by the lending agencies, is considerably higher than 
debt owed to these sources as reported in the 1991-92 survey. Specifically, they suggest 
that while the survey estimates of household debt owed to co-operative societies/banks 6 
and commercial banks are of the order of Rs.69,420 million and Rs.100,850 million 
respectively (adding up to Rs.170,270 million), the corresponding estimates as provided 
by the lending agencies are in the region of Rs.201,730 million and Rs.454,160 million 
respectively (adding up to Rs.655,890 million). Institutional debt in respect of these 
agencies, as reported by the survey, is then Rs.170,270 million, while what is available 
from a consolidation of the accounts of co-operative societies/banks and commercial 
banks suggests a figure in the region of Rs.655,890 million; the survey estimate is thus 
only around 26 per cent of a more realistic figure. Adding debt owed to other 
institutional agencies (Rs.48,531 million) to the upwardly revised figure of debt owed to 
co-operative societies/banks and commercial banks (Rs.655,890 million), yields a total 
institutional debt figure of Rs.704,421 million.  
Table 1: Indebtedness over time at the all-India level 
















1961-62 62.80  NA  NA  NA 
1971-72 42.87  4.43  NA  NA 
1981-82  19.97 1.83 17.36 2.54 
1991-92  23.40 1.78 19.30 2.51 
2002-03  26.50 2.84 17.80 2.82 
Source: Reserve Bank of India (1965); NSSO (1985 37th Round, Report No.318); NSSO (1998 48th 
Round); and NSSO (2005 59th Round, Report No.500). 
 
Further, both Rao and Tripathi, and Satyasai, point out that, despite an increase in 
banking activities and the operations of commercial banks and co-operative societies, 
the share of institutional agencies in rural household debt, as reported by the surveys, 
declined over the period 1981-82-1991-92; this share, in 1991-92, was nearly 60 per 
cent at the all-India level (rural and urban areas combined). The high share of non-
institutional debt is not implausible, considering, among other things, that, in the rural 
areas, interlinked transactions in the product and credit markets (through the mediation 
of traders-cum-moneylenders) have been a feature of agricultural modernization over 
the 1980s (see Janakarajan 1992). For both the rural and urban areas together, it may 
therefore not be unreasonable to suppose that the share of institutional debt in all 
household debt in 1991-92 was around 60 per cent, as suggested by the survey. Then, an 
estimate of total household indebtedness for 1991-92, given that institutional debt was 
around Rs.704,421 million (see above), would be Rs.1,174,035 million ( = 704,421/0.6). 
Total indebtedness, as reported by the 1991-92 survey, was only Rs.373,163 million. In 
terms of these calculations, it is not implausible that the extent of indebtedness in 1991-
92 was around 3.15 times larger than the estimate yielded by the survey. A similar 
qualification seems to be indicated for the 2002-03 survey as well: in particular, rural 
indebtedness and debt-induced farmer suicides, which have been widely reported in the 
media in the time after the year 2000, are not commensurately reflected in the 2002-03 
data.  7 
 
Table 2: The inverse monotonicity between indebtedness and asset-holdings: India, 
2002-03 
Size class of 
household asset-
holdings (rupees) 
Average value of 
cash loans 
(rupees) 






0-15000 1443  6317  22.84 
15000-30000 2510  22353  11.23 
30000-60000 3251  44595  7.29 
60000-100000 4323  78359  5.52 
100000-150000 5279  123453  4.28 
150000-200000 5729  173397  3.30 
200000-300000 7458  244483  3.05 
300000-450000 10201  367066  2.78 
450000-800000 16772  592415  2.83 
≥ 800000  36712  1752321  2.10 
Aggregate 8694  306967  2.83 
Source: Computations based on data in NSSO (2005 59th Round, Report No.500). 
 
3.3  Assets: average holdings across space and over time 
Table 3 presents information, at the all-India level, on the nominal and real values of 
asset-holdings per household, over the period of the five surveys. As noted in 
Subramanian and Jayaraj (2006), the frustrating non-availability of a suitable price 
index makes comparisons of real magnitudes difficult. For want of an alternative, one 
might have recourse to the Wholesale Price Index (WPI), as Vaidyanathan (1993) does, 
or the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Assuming that these price indices can serve as at 
least rough surrogates for an asset price indicator, Table 3 suggests that there has been a 
clear survey-to-survey increase in the real value of asset-holdings per household. 
 
Table 4 presents detailed data for India and for its major states on the average (nominal) 
value of asset-holdings per household, and on both the Gini and Theil indices of 
inequality. (Theil actually advanced two indices; and the one we employ, sometimes 
referred to as Theil 1, is given by T = (1/nμ)Σi=1
nailog(ai/μ), where ai is the asset-holding 
of the ith of n households, and μ is mean asset-holding.) These data are provided for the 
years 1961-62, 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2002-03 for the rural areas, and for the 
last three years for the urban areas. Data for the union territories have been omitted, and 
are confined to those states (15 in number) which are common across the surveys. It 
should be noted that data for the state of Haryana, which was then a part of Punjab, are 
not separately provided in 1961-62, while in 2002-03, the data for ‘Bihar’ are actually 
combined from those for Bihar and Jharkhand which was carved out of Bihar; and 
similar adjustments have been made for Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, following 
on the creation of the states of Chhattisgarh and Uttaranchal respectively.  8 
Table 3: Nominal and real values of asset-holdings per household, India 1961-62 – 
2002-03 
Asset-holdings per household (rupees) 
Year  Nominal  Real (deflated by WPI)  Real (deflated by CPI) 
  R U  C R U C R U C 
1961-62  5267 NA  NA 27290 NA  NA 22900 NA  NA 
1971-72  11343 NA  NA 30740 NA  NA 25780 NA  NA 
1981-82 36089 40566  37157 36089 40566 37157 36089 40556 37157 
1991-92  107007  144330  116873  51570 69557 56324 49540 65904 53865 
2002-03  265606  417158  306967  66640  104664  77017 66568 90099 72990 
Note: (a) WPI = Wholesale Price Index; CPI = Consumer Price Index; R = Rural; U = Urban; 
C = Combined. Data on WPI and CPI, for the years before 2002-03, are from Centre for Monitoring Indian 
Economy:  Basic Statistics for the Indian Economy (August 1993); and  for the year 2002-03 are from 
Annual Statistical Abstract 2002-2003. (b) Time-series data on the official exchange rate are available on 
the statistical website Indiastat.com. The data indicate that the annual average exchange rates, as 
expressed in Indian rupees per US dollar in 1961-62, 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2002-03 were, 
respectively, 4.76, 7.43, 8.97, 24.47 and 48.40. The all-India combined mean asset-holding per household, 
in US dollars at current domestic prices and exchange rates, were then of the order of: US$4142 in 1981-
82, US$4776 in 1991-92, and US$6342 in 2002-03.  
 
There is a fair degree of stability over time in the rankings of states according to average 
asset-holdings per household. This is particularly well-marked at the lower and upper 
extremes. Data for the years 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2002-03 (see Table 4) 
suggest that in rural India, the five worst-performing states have been Orissa, Tamil 
Nadu, West Bengal, Assam and Andhra Pradesh, while the top five states have been 
Punjab, Haryana, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. The case of Kerala is of interest: 
from seventh place in 1971-72 it has moved up to third place in 1981-82, and 
maintained that rank in 1991-92 and 2002-03; an outcome greatly aided by repatriation 
of funds by migrants to the Gulf countries. In the urban areas, the five worst-performing 
states have been Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Assam and West Bengal, while the 
front-rankers have been Kerala, Haryana, Punjab, and Maharashtra. Taking both urban 
and rural areas into account, the polarities are described by Punjab, Haryana and Kerala 
at the top, and, systematically, Orissa at the bottom. The data suggest that all the states 
of the Indian Union have registered improvements in their mean asset-holding position, 
but in the rural areas the initially better-off states have outpaced the worse-off ones over 
time.  
3.4 Asset  composition 
It should be noted straightaway that there is one feature of asset composition which 
sharply differentiates a developing country from an industrialized one: a predominantly 
rural and agrarian economy like India displays an asset portfolio which is significantly 
more strongly weighted in favour of physical assets than one would expect from the 
experience of industrialized economies in which financial assets play a relatively vastly 
more important role. A comparative picture of the division between tangible and 
financial assets as it obtains for India and for selected industrialized countries reveals  
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Table 4: Average asset-holdings per household and inequality in their distribution: India and states, rural and urban, 1961-62, 1971-72, 1981-
82, 1991-92, 2002-03 
  Rural 
   Year  India  AP  Assam  Bihar  Gujarat  Haryana Karnataka Kerala MP  Maharashtra Orissa  Punjab  Rajasthan TN  UP  WB 
1961-62  5267 5619 3023 5491 6496    6864 5137 4089  5072  3472  10113 5249 5093 5182  3898 
1971-72 11343  8094  7809  12831 12847 27132 10772 11632 10513  11677  6023  31844 12762  6839  13574  7339 
1981-82 36089 26213 23170 32313 36834 90729 32988 76422 29885  35122  17539 96588 40863 19559 44658  20726 





   2002-03  265606 135146 145782 193022 327864 716379 248409 509679 224836 252749  98454  903717 358351 181376 333467 151842 
1961-62 0.6440 0.7139 0.5340 0.6783 0.6080    0.6482 0.7147 0.5853  0.6469  0.5621 0.6090 0.5098 0.7056 0.5850  0.6420 
1971-72 0.6564 0.7033 0.5548 0.6715 0.6337 0.6290 0.6773 0.6612 0.5888  0.6487  0.5975 0.6828 0.5592 0.7117 0.5911  0.6603 
1981-82 0.6354 0.6607 0.5934 0.6328 0.5844 0.5586 0.6221 0.6047 0.5893  0.6326  0.6030 0.6524 0.5256 0.6668 0.5752  0.6083 




  2002-03 0.6289 0.6271 0.4910 0.5823 0.5990 0.6134 0.5621 0.5539 0.5864  0.6247  0.5830 0.6105 0.5154 0.6386 0.5688  0.5771 
1961-62 0.8031 1.0277 0.5439 0.9034 0.6714    0.8423 1.0374 0.6679  0.7834  0.6097 0.6702 0.4864 0.9897 0.6614  0.7794 
1971-72 0.8471 1.0192 0.5624 0.8876 0.7620 0.7149 0.9585 0.8672 0.6509  0.7961  0.7054 0.8703 0.5949 1.0311 0.6545  0.8419 
1981-82 0.8013 0.8613 0.8109 0.7734 0.6419 0.5920 0.8022 0.7065 0.6823  0.7857  0.6978 0.8238 0.5295 0.9087 0.6318  0.6947 
1991-92 0.7123 0.8051 0.4142 0.6838 0.5216 0.5226 0.5452  0.536  0.6848  0.6618  0.5558 0.6258 0.5205 0.8155 0.5528  0.5735 




   2002-03 0.7501 0.7641 0.4227 0.6384 0.6529 0.7152 0.5950 0.5438 0.6409  0.7299  0.7018 0.7293 0.4651 0.7995 0.5829  0.6011 
  Urban 
   Year  India  AP  Assam  Bihar  Gujarat  Haryana Karnataka Kerala MP  Maharashtra Orissa  Punjab  Rajasthan TN  UP  WB 
1981-82 40566 31776 32323 35586 43077 59565 42200 111647  27716  42380  21533 54569 39940 33507 37688  28146 
1991-92 144330 94813 112184 98958 160047 151211 125123 221524  117340 165151  72338 255702 161044 119614 157542 101116 
Average asset-
holdings per 
household (rs.)   2002-03  417158 356656 276793 291253 459333 672684 377726 762200 415100 419667  250218 560705 492805 322129 373289 322023 
1981-82 0.7037 0.7398 0.6431 0.6956 0.6819 0.5705 0.6863 0.6425 0.6530  0.7092  0.7351 0.6347 0.6026 0.7278 0.6842  0.6948 
1991-92 0.6805 0.7145 0.6847 0.6181 0.6274 0.6238 0.6774 0.5256  0.666  0.7056  0.7123 0.5841 0.6275 0.7387 0.6493  0.6545 
Gini co-efficient 
of inequality 
   2002-03 0.6643 0.7328 0.6317 0.6245 0.6365 0.6590 0.7032 0.5390 0.6280  0.6764  0.6584 0.6033 0.5654 0.7037 0.6088  0.6510 10 
1981-82 1.0224 1.1476 0.7728 1.0368 0.9512 0.6014 0.9335 0.8224 0.8391  1.0463  1.1046 0.7743 0.6838 1.1287 0.9816  0.9168 
1991-92  0.881  0.9918 0.8990 0.7112 0.7228 0.7168 0.8616 0.5157 0.8309  0.9853  1.0088 0.6442 0.7259 1.0847 0.7945  0.7853 
Theil index of  
Inequality 
   2002-03 0.8241  1.062  0.7273 0.7129 0.7429 0.8353 0.9504 0.5362 0.7189  0.8637  0.8138 0.6673 0.5733 0.9452 0.6829  0.7748 
Source: Computations based on data in Reserve Bank of India (1965), Reserve Bank of India (1975), NSSO (1985; 37
th Round, Report No.318), NSSO (1998; 48
th Round), and 
NSSO (2005: 59th Round, Report No.500). 
Table 5a: Size class-wise composition of rural assets for India, rural and/ or urban, 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92, 2002-03 
Year Size  class 
 
Per cent contribution of asset component to total value of assets 
















1  3.04 55.65  8.70 3.91 0.00 0.00 26.96  1.74 100.00 
2 11.11  54.31  11.94  3.19  0.00 0.00 17.64  1.81 100.00 
3 29.80  40.10  12.79  2.62  0.00 0.00 11.84  2.86 100.00 
4 47.17  28.94  11.64  2.11  0.00 0.00 7.99 2.14 100.00 
5  57.51  23.17  9.93 2.14 0.00 0.00 5.87 1.37 100.00 
6  62.89  20.03  8.41 2.22 0.00 0.00 5.21 1.23 100.00 
7  66.04  18.67  7.29 2.18 0.00 0.00 4.70 1.13 100.00 
8  68.53  16.99  6.41 2.46 0.00 0.00 4.28 1.32 100.00 
9  71.23  15.71  5.33 2.68 0.00 0.00 3.79 1.27 100.00 
10  73.39  14.72  4.16 2.94 0.00 0.00 3.44 1.35 100.00 
Rural 1971-72 
11  75.29  12.82  2.64 4.22 0.00 0.00 2.45 2.58 100.00 
1  15.96  32.73  4.85 1.82 1.82 1.62 38.79  2.22 99.80 
2  29.26  38.94  9.11 0.91 0.95 1.16 17.66  2.00 100.00 
3  40.22  32.86  9.36 0.86 0.70 0.94 12.93  2.13 100.00 
4  48.67  27.13  8.87 1.08 0.43 1.02 10.88  1.93 100.00 
5  56.46  23.65  6.88 1.53 0.32 0.94 8.83 1.40 100.00 
Rural 1981-82 
6  62.12  21.18  5.11 2.00 0.23 0.86 7.26 1.25 100.00 11 
7  68.46  17.62  3.12 3.22 0.22 0.90 5.17 1.28 100.00 
8  74.86  11.79  2.26 4.96 0.45 1.45 3.16 1.07 100.00 
1  18.04  35.15  5.53 1.16 1.16 2.65 31.34  4.93 99.96 
2  28.87  39.54  6.83 0.71 0.83 1.79 19.33  2.08 99.99 
3  35.35  39.24  7.47 0.70 0.68 1.32 13.22  2.01 100.01 
4  42.15  35.67  6.78 0.77 0.54 1.08 11.00  2.00 99.99 
5  48.16  33.16  6.49 0.91 0.55 1.00 8.62 1.13 100.00 
6  51.14  29.67  5.56 1.03 0.40 1.02 7.80 3.37 100.00 
7  54.78  28.83  5.11 1.34 0.31 1.02 7.24 1.38 100.00 
8  59.19  25.89  4.28 1.43 0.36 0.91 6.73 1.20 99.99 
9  62.56  23.55  3.42 1.54 0.26 1.10 6.07 1.49 100.00 
Rural 1991-92 
10  73.36  14.67  1.94 3.22 0.26 1.38 4.16 1.00 100.00 
1  22.46  32.17  3.41 1.03 1.20 2.33 32.98  4.41 100.00 
2  30.14  43.32  3.86 0.68 0.65 1.23 17.33  2.81 100.00 
3  34.95  44.82  4.04 0.57 0.45 1.05 12.08  2.04 100.00 
4  42.77  40.22  4.01 0.66 0.46 0.86 9.02 2.00 100.00 
5  48.76  35.82  3.78 0.69 0.46 0.82 7.58 2.08 100.00 
6  52.29  32.88  3.58 0.84 0.42 0.87 6.84 2.29 100.00 
7  57.42  29.26  2.99 0.96 0.30 0.96 6.08 2.04 100.00 
8  59.40  26.97  2.43 1.35 0.42 1.03 5.69 2.74 100.00 
9  62.83  23.46  1.82 2.12 0.33 1.37 4.94 3.13 100.00 
Rural 2002-03 
10  73.78  14.98  1.16 2.91 0.30 1.81 3.07 1.99 100.00 
1  1.78 8.12  1.27 0.25 4.06 5.08 70.30  9.14 100.00 
2  10.42  15.19  2.08 0.11 2.99 3.28 49.60  16.35  100.00 
3  16.34  21.55  1.42 0.07 2.07 1.93 35.75  20.86  100.00 
4  20.84  26.82  1.51 0.12 1.51 1.94 27.82  19.43  100.00 
5  25.61  34.24  1.30 0.22 1.67 1.86 20.90  14.20  100.00 
6  29.35  38.83  0.96 0.30 1.33 2.07 16.36  10.81  100.00 
7  35.51  37.80  0.53 0.51 1.95 2.95 11.63  9.11 100.00 
Urban 1981-82 
8  43.80  33.97  0.60 0.64 3.90 2.71 5.89 8.49 100.00 12 
1  1.54  7.70  0.65 0.12 3.26 6.04 74.53  6.22 100.06 
2  7.93  15.88  0.89 0.11 3.74 4.23 57.79  9.41 99.99 
3  14.77 22.92  1.42 0.08 1.96 3.10 44.80  10.94  99.99 
4  22.99 26.69  1.03 0.08 1.69 2.58 33.72  11.21  100.00 
5  23.23 30.11  1.04 0.09 1.39 3.43 28.30  12.43  100.00 
6  26.80 35.52  0.60 0.08 1.24 2.78 21.46  11.53  100.00 
7  29.87 34.07  0.69 0.09 1.49 2.88 19.08  11.83  100.00 
8  32.28 38.10  0.71 0.16 0.96 2.37 14.66  10.76  100.00 
9  32.84 39.03  0.71 0.19 1.13 2.75 13.29  10.06  99.99 
Urban 1991-92
10  38.57 41.19  0.25 0.32 1.59 3.16 7.85 7.07 100.00 
1  2.59  5.43  0.24 0.09 2.93 3.98 73.06  11.70  100.00 
2  10.35 13.99  0.53 0.06 2.54 3.73 59.12  9.66 100.00 
3  18.30 24.79  0.59 0.09 1.81 3.75 39.22  11.46  100.00 
4  25.62 32.87  0.59 0.05 1.41 4.08 24.40  10.98  100.00 
5  28.31 36.05  0.46 0.07 1.29 3.28 17.96  12.58  100.00 
6  31.00 40.22  0.37 0.07 1.37 2.09 13.68  11.20  100.00 
7  31.97 40.45  0.48 0.07 1.13 2.87 11.73  11.31  100.00 
8  31.98 43.34  0.39 0.08 0.99 2.57 10.10  10.56  100.00 
9  35.45 41.78  0.29 0.13 0.99 2.78 8.79 9.79 100.00 
Urban 2002-03
10  42.41 36.50  0.11 0.30 1.54 4.46 5.69 8.99 100.00 
Note: The categories ‘non-farm business equipment’ and ’all transport equipment’ do not figure in the 1971/72 Survey. 
Source: Calculations based on data in Reserve Bank of India (1975); NSSO (1985) 37th Round; NSSO (1998) 48th Round; and NSSO (2005) 59th Round.  13 
Table 5B: Size class-wise composition of assets for India, rural and urban combined, 1981-82, 1991-92, 2002-03  
Year  Size class  Per cent contribution of asset component to total value of assets 



























1  10.65   23.85   3.44   1.12   2.61   2.94   52.50   2.89   100.00 
2  25.00   33.56   7.52   0.74   1.41   1.63   24.88   5.29   100.00 
3  35.09   30.44   7.66   0.69   0.99   1.16   17.83   6.14   100.00 
4  42.91   27.07   7.34   0.89   0.65   1.21   14.38   5.55   100.00 
5  50.25   25.76   5.76   1.27   0.59   1.13   11.26   3.99   100.00 
6  54.16   25.46   4.10   1.59   0.49   1.16   9.47   3.57   100.00 
7  59.19   23.30   2.39   2.46   0.71   1.48   6.98   3.48   100.00 
1981-82 
8  62.42   20.68   1.59   3.23   1.83   1.96   4.25   4.04   100.00 
1 11.96  24.94  3.72  0.77  1.93 3.89  47.38  5.40  100.00 
2 24.20  34.31  5.52  0.59  1.48 2.33  27.84  3.73  100.00 
3 31.05  35.72  6.17  0.57  0.95 1.70  19.94  3.90  100.00 
4 37.95  33.74  5.54  0.62  0.82 1.41  15.92  4.01  100.00 
5 43.17  32.57  5.40  0.74  0.70 1.48  12.56  3.38  100.00 
6 45.81  30.95  4.48  0.82  0.58 1.41  10.79  5.16  100.00 
7 49.40  30.00  4.15  1.07  0.56 1.42  9.78  3.62  100.00 
8 52.06  29.11  3.33  1.09  0.52 1.30  8.84  3.74  100.00 
9 54.48  27.75  2.68  1.17  0.50 1.55  8.03  3.83  100.00 
1991-92 
10 59.61  25.15  1.27  2.07  0.79 2.08  5.62  3.40  100.00 
 14 
1 14.80  21.86  2.19  0.67  1.87 2.97  48.43  7.22  100.00 
2 25.84  36.96  3.14  0.54  1.06 1.77  26.40  4.30  100.00 
3 31.86  41.09  3.40  0.48  0.71 1.55  17.13  3.79  100.00 
4 39.55  38.77  3.34  0.53  0.68 1.50  12.06  3.73  100.00 
5 44.35  35.87  3.06  0.56  0.64 1.35  9.82  4.35  100.00 
6 47.75  34.45  2.90  0.68  0.62 1.14  8.30  4.19  100.00 
7 51.14  32.02  2.37  0.74  0.51 1.43  7.47  4.33  100.00 
8 51.66  31.59  1.85  0.99  0.58 1.47  6.92  4.95  100.00 
9 53.35  29.81  1.29  1.44  0.56 1.86  6.27  5.44  100.00 
2002-03 
10 59.11  25.03  0.67  1.69  0.88 3.05  4.29  5.26  100.00 
Source: Calculations based on data in NSSO (1985) 37th Round; NSSO (1998) 48th Round; NSSO (2005) 59th Round. 
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the following: the share of financial assets in all assets was 5.01 per cent for India in 
2002-03, 18.2 per cent for Italy in 1991 (Brandolini et al. 2004: table 7), 21.2 per cent 
for Canada in 1984 (Morissette et al. 2003: table 1), 24 per cent for Sweden in 1975 
(Spant 1981: table 2), and 22.1 per cent for Germany in 1983 (Hauser and Stein 2003). 
Thus, while financial assets in the industrialized countries could easily account for a 
fifth of the value of all assets, the corresponding share in India is only around a 
twentieth. We shall return to this theme a little later. 
 
Table 5A presents a comprehensive picture of the composition of household assets at 
the all-India level, for the rural areas in 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2002-03, and 
for the urban areas in 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2002-03, disaggregated by the size class 
intervals of household asset-holdings relevant for the respective surveys. Table 5B 
presents these data at the combined (rural and urban) level for 1981-82, 1991-92 and 
2002-03. The data for rural India in 1991-92 are typical of a pattern in which asset 
diversification is a declining function of aggregate wealth, with specialization in land 
rising with wealth. If we divide the population into the poorest 51 per cent and richest 
49 per cent of households, then we find that among themselves three asset 
components—land, buildings and durable household assets—account for 89 per cent of 
the value of all assets for the poorest 51 per cent and for nearly 92 per cent for the 
richest 49 per cent. For the first group, the shares of land, buildings and durable 
household assets are 43.09 per cent, 35.08 per cent and 10.87 per cent, whereas, in 
contrast, there is a much heavier emphasis on land for the second group, with land 
accounting for 66.67 per cent, buildings for 19.92 per cent, and durable household 
assets for 5.34 per cent. The contrast becomes sharper when we compare the asset 
composition of the poorest 7.5 per cent of households with that of the richest 14.4 per 
cent: the three asset components under discussion account for about 85 per cent of the 
value of all assets for the poor group and for about 92 per cent for the rich group; the 
relative shares of land, buildings and durable household assets for the poor group are 
18.04 per cent, 35.15 per cent and 31.34 per cent, with a markedly different picture 
emerging for the rich group, as reflected in corresponding shares of 73.36 per cent, 
14.67 per cent and 4.16 per cent respectively. This pattern of asset diversification 
contrasts with that in the developed countries, where there is some suggestion—see, for 
instance, King and Leape (1984) who employ survey data for the late 1970s in the 
USA—that diversification tends to increase with wealth. Land continues to remain the 
symbol and substance of both wealth and power in rural India. It may be added that 
while durable household assets account for just a little over 4 per cent of the asset 
portfolio of the richest 14.4 per cent of households in 1991-92, this share is as high as 
31 per cent for the poorest 7.5 per cent of households, but the per household holding of 
durable assets for the rich group (at Rs.22,650) is nearly 29 times the corresponding 
figure (Rs.782) for the poor group. Issues of inequality will be considered in greater 
detail at a later stage.  
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Table 6 presents a more aggregated time-series picture of asset composition in India. 
The numbers in the table confirm that wealth in rural India is heavily land-dominated. 
There is a fair measure of inter-temporal stability in the asset composition, with land 
accounting for about two-thirds of the value of all assets, followed by buildings which 
account for about a fifth, and durable household assets edging out the share of livestock 
and poultry over time. Among themselves, these four asset components account for 
about 95 per cent of all wealth. The share of both non-farm business equipment and 
transport equipment has increased over time, but their weight in the overall asset value 
is very small. In the urban areas, land and buildings between themselves claim between 
two-thirds and three-fourths of the total value of assets, with buildings being somewhat 
weightier than land. The third most important asset component in the urban areas is 
durable household assets, followed by financial assets, though the latter has overtaken 
the former in 2002-03: these two components, along with land and buildings, claim 
about 94 per cent of the value of all assets. Between 1981-82 and 2002-03, the (small) 
share of transport equipment has risen, but the shares of durable household assets and 
financial assets have declined to the gain of land and buildings. Financial assets are 
significantly more important in the urban areas than in the rural. Between 1991-92 and 
2002-03, at the combined all-India level, the share of financial assets has risen from 3.6 
per cent to 5 per cent, but given the large weight of rural population in total population, 
the overall picture is still very heavily biased in favour of physical assets, in particular, 
land. Even in 2002-03, financial assets are overwhelmingly constituted by deposits 
(92.3 per cent of the total), with shares accounting for only 4.5 per cent. 
Table 6: Asset composition of household wealth for India, rural and/or urban, 1971-72, 
1981-82, 1991-92, 2002-03 































1971r 66.22  18.42  6.46  2.73 NA  NA  4.61  1.55  100 
1981r 62.12  20.71  4.98  2.47 0.30  0.96  7.10  1.37  100 
1991r 64.25  21.40  3.38  2.23 0.32  1.21  5.88  1.33  100 
2002r 63.22  23.53  2.10  1.98 0.35  1.39  5.11  2.32  100 
1981u 32.36  35.65  0.83  0.41  2.05 2.51  15.14  11.05  100 
1991u 35.80  39.46  0.42  0.26  1.48 3.03  11.29  8.26  100 
2002u 38.54  37.84  0.21  0.22  1.38 3.85  8.37  9.58  100 
Note: ‘r’ stands for ‘rural’ and ‘u’ for ‘urban’. 
Source: Calculations based on data in Reserve Bank of India (1975); NSSO (1985) 37th Round, NSSO 
(1998) 48th Round; NSSO (2005) 59th Round. 
 
It bears remarking that the picture presented above is seldom reflected in the pink press 
or the visual media: entire television channels are devoted to a continuous monitoring of 
the stock market, and to the consumer durables-oriented life style of the urban elite. The   17
dominant reality on the ground presents a stark contrast to this construction. From a 
major country-wide household survey conducted in 2000 by NCAER (2000), it emerges 
that only an estimated 8 per cent of all Indian households had invested in either or both 
of equity shares and debentures at the end of the financial year 1998-99. Comparison 
with a 1986 Survey of Financial Assets conducted by the NCAER suggests that investor 
households have grown at a compound rate of 22 per cent per year between 1985-86 
and 1998-99; further comparison with the results of a SEBI survey conducted in 1991-
92 reveals that this growth has been much sharper in the post 1991-92 period (the water-
shed year for economic liberalization in the country). Despite these developments, by 
the turn of the millennium, 92 per cent of all Indian households had no direct investment 
in equity shares—see Rediff Money Special (2000). 
 
The situation is not very different in the matter of durable household assets. Despite 
their relatively large presence in the wealth portfolio of the poor, there is reason to 
believe that the nature and quality of durables owned by the poor is of doubtful value. 
Data on the ownership of assets and amenities provided by Census of India 2001 (tables 
on houses, amenities and assets are available on compact disk) confirm this proposition. 
For a class of consumer durables constituted by radios/transistors, television sets, 
telephones, bicycles, scooters, motorcycles and mopeds, and cars, vans and jeeps, it 
turns out that the headcount ratio of households which do not own any of these durables, 
not even a radio, is as high as 34.5 per cent. These deprivation statistics are compatible 
with the positive relationship between consumer expenditure and wealth: as the 1991-92 
survey unsurprisingly reveals, for both rural and urban India, average household asset-
holdings systematically rise with the per capita expenditure class in which the 
households fall.  
 
Briefly, and in the light of the statistics reviewed above, it would appear to be 
premature, unrealistic, and essentially diversionary to construct India’s wealth status in 
the image of a small, enclave, urban elite’s aspirations. In the larger scheme of things, 
financial assets and durables in India are still nowhere near imitating their relative 
significance in the industrialized West. It is worth underlining the issue: misplaced 
priorities can not only cost a government its seat (as happened in India’s General 
Elections of 2004), but derail important programmes and policy orientations. The 
proposition is nowhere more evident than in the sadly discredited and all-but-forgotten 
role of land reform as an egalitarian and anti-poverty instrument in India’s economic 
development. This brings us directly to a consideration of distributional questions. 
3.5  Vertical inequality in the distribution of household assets  
The polarities: assetless-ness and the top 1 per cent 
Sample data at either end of a distribution are in general not very reliable. Further, 
‘assetless-ness’ is a necessarily somewhat vague notion: it is unlikely to be an accurate 
description of the state of being literally in possession of no assets of any kind whatever,   18
and what constitutes assetless-ness could also well be temporally, spatially, and 
culturally variable. Subject to these qualifications, and confining ourselves to 1991-92 
and 2002-03, we find that the proportion of assetless households in the country as a 
whole has declined from 0.41 per cent to 0.12 per cent. It is significant that a 
preponderant majority of assetless households in 1991-92 were single-member 
households: the microdata suggest that of the households without assets, 81 per cent in 
the rural areas and 95 per cent in the urban areas were single-member households—
possibly comprising elderly widows or widowers. The immensity of India’s population 
allows very large numbers to be absorbed in very small proportions. Thus, the number 
of households without any asset-base to fall back upon in the event of an adverse state 
of nature is distressingly huge: this figure, in 2002-03, was 0.26 million—a little more 
than one-twelfth of Portugal’s total number of households of 3.15 million, and 1.7 times 
Luxembourg’s 0.15 million households. The issue is not just one of relative deprivation, 
but of stark and absolute destitution. 
 
The microdata for 1991-92 permit us to explore the upper end of the asset spectrum. 
The wealthiest household in urban India is reported to have had assets of the value of 
Rs.14.30 million, with a corresponding figure of Rs.12.70 million in rural India. The 
data suggest that, at the all-India level, the wealthiest 1 per cent of households—call 
these the ‘rich’ households—accounted for 16.67 per cent of the value of all assets. The 
caste-related distribution of the burdens and benefits of society are revealed starkly in 
the following summary statistics. The ratio of the incidence of scheduled caste and 
scheduled tribe (SCST) assetless-ness to that of non-SCST assetless-ness is in excess of 
3, while the ratio of the incidence of non-SCST ‘richness’ to that of SCST ‘richness’ is 
15. It is doubtful that, in the absence of deliberate over-sampling of the very rich, the 
true wealth status of this category of households will have been captured in the sample 
surveys. We shall return to this issue at a later stage. 
Inter-household inequality in the distribution of assets: the picture at the all-India level 
Table 4 presents information for India and its major states on the Gini co-efficient 
(calculated from various surveys grouped distributional data by the usual ‘geometric’ 
method) and the Theil index of inequality. Taking rural India as a whole, following a 
slight increase in the value of the Gini co-efficient from 0.6440 in 1961-62 to 0.6564 in 
1971-72, there is a subsequent decline—to 0.6354 in 1981-82 and to 0.6207 in 1991-
92—with a slight upturn again, to 0.6289 in 2002-03. The Theil index describes a 
similar pattern: 0.8031 in 1961-62, 0.8471 in 1971-72, 0.8013 in 1981-82, 0.7123 in 
1991-92, and 0.7501 in 2002-03. Urban inequality is substantially higher than rural 
inequality, but there has been a continuous decline in inequality in urban India from 
1981-82 to 2002-03, with Gini values of 0.7037 in 1981-82, 0.6805 in 1991-92, and 
0.6443 in 2002-03, and corresponding Theil values of 1.0224, 0.8810 and 0.8241 
respectively. The overall picture, then, is one of greater inequality in the urban than in 
the rural areas with, by and large, an indication of over-time decline in both areas. 
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As has been discussed in Subramanian and Jayaraj (2006), there is a case for 
interpreting these figures, especially the temporal pattern, with a good deal of caution. 
Apart from the possibility of increasing under-reporting and under-valuation of assets 
(especially land and buildings) over time, there are also problems of comparability of 
grouped data occasioned by variable numbers of size classes over time and unverifiable 
impacts of inflation, via the particular size classification that has been resorted to from 
survey to survey, on the estimate of inequality. Thus, the all-India (combined rural and 
urban) estimate of the Gini co-efficient obtained from the published grouped data of the 
1991-92 survey, at 0.6434, is lower than the estimate, at 0.6683, obtained by employing 
the individual household observations available in the microdata set.  
 
It would be distinctly helpful to be able to present distributional information in the form 
of fractile shares. This is aided, when we are working with grouped data, by the ability 
to estimate the equation of the Lorenz curve. Two methods of estimation based on 
parameterized Lorenz curves are the so-called Beta method of Kakwani (1980) and the 
General Quadratic (GQ) method of Villasenor and Arnold (1989). Employing the 
algorithmized computational procedure for the GQ method available in the ‘POVCAL’ 
package created by Chen et al. (1991), it proved possible to obtain fitted Lorenz curves 
for the distribution of household asset-holdings at the all-India (combined rural and 
urban) level for 1991-92 and 2002-03.  
Table 7: Decile shares in total value of assets: India (rural and urban combined) 1991-
92, 2002-03 















per household (rs) 
1
st 0.00133  1558  0.00246  7539 
2
nd 0.00726  8487  0.00786  24118 
3
rd 0.01441  16836  0.01447  44418 
4
th 0.02323  27144  0.02277  69890 
5
th 0.03447  40279  0.03352  102895 
6
th 0.04943  57769  0.04808  147596 
7
th 0.07069  82607  0.06913  212197 
8
th 0.10423  121810  0.10294  315989 
9
th 0.16956  198154  0.16997  521752 
10
th 0.52540  614005  0.52881  1623273 
Share of top 5%  0.38225    0.38319   
Share of top 1%  0.16222    0.15717   
Gini co-efficient  0.66820    0.66875   
Source: Computations based on data in NSSO (1998) 48th Round and (2005) 59th Round, after estimating 
the equation of the Lorenz curve by the General Quadratic Method Using POVCAL. 
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Table 7 presents a picture of considerable inequality. The asset share of the poorest 50 
per cent of the population is just 8.07 per cent in 1991-92 and 8.11 per cent in 2002-03. 
The average asset-holding of the richest decile exceeds that of the poorest decile by a 
factor of around 39,400 per cent in each of the years 1991-92 and 2002-03. The asset 
share of the very rich (top 1 per cent) is a little higher, at 16.22 per cent, in 1991-92 than 
it is, at 15.72 per cent, in 2002-03. The median asset value, at Rs.48,123 (respectively, 
Rs.122,809) is just 41.2 per cent (respectively, 40.01 per cent) of the mean value, at 
Rs.116,873 (respectively, Rs.306,967) in 1991-92 (respectively, 2002-03). The 
cumulative density functions (cdfs) are plotted in Figure 1, and the Lorenz curves of the 
distributions in Figure 2. Each of the cdfs in Figure 2 is typical of a concentrated 
distribution, as reflected in the small clearance between the curve and its western and 
northern boundaries. Each of the Lorenz curves likewise displays a substantial deviation 
from the diagonal of the unit square, and it is virtually impossible to distinguish the two 
curves. The Gini co-efficients calculated from the fitted Lorenz curves are larger than 
those obtained through the usual ‘geometric’ method from the grouped survey data: 
0.6682 for 1991-92 and 0.6688 for 2002-03. It may be added that the distribution of 
household assets is pronouncedly more unequal than the distribution of household 
consumption expenditure: the microdata for 1991-92 suggest that the asset Gini is 
0.6683, while the consumption expenditure Gini is 0.3505. Also, the asset share of the 
top 1 per cent, in 1991-92, at 16.2 per cent, is much higher than the income share of the 
top 1 per cent, which is estimated at 7 per cent, on the basis of income-tax returns, by 
Banerjee and Piketty (2003: figure 3).  
Figure 1: Cumulative density functions for asset distribution: India (rural and urban 
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Figure 2: Lorenz curves for asset distribution: India (rural and urban combined) 1991-
92, 2002-03 
































As was noted earlier, the true wealth status of the very rich is unlikely to be accurately 
reflected without resort to deliberate over-sampling of this category of households. 
Comparison with alternative sources of information for the 1991-92 and earlier surveys 
has proved to be difficult. For more recent years, data from journalistic sources on the 
very rich are available. For instance, Forbes Magazine mentions nine Indians among the 
world’s wealthiest persons in 2004. Business Standard magazine (2005) provides a list 
of the 178 wealthiest individuals/families in India, and the list is available for 2003 and 
2004 (as on 31 August of the respective years). Sinha (2006) has analyzed these data, 
and he shows that the distribution of wealth of these ultra-rich households is well-
approximated by the Pareto distribution. The richest entity, according to the Business 
Standard list, increased its wealth from Rs.189,636 million in 2003 to Rs.311,984 
million in 2004: this sort of quantum leap is very much a feature of the burgeoning 
Information and Technology sector of corporate industry. The wealth of the least 
wealthy on the 2003 list is Rs.192.4 million (around 3.98 million USD at the 2002-03 
exchange rate); the lower bound on the highest (open-ended) size class interval for asset 
ownership, as reported in the 2002-03 survey, is, by comparison, a paltry Rs.0.8 million  
(or 16,529 USD). 
 
The purist may frown upon an attempt at directly incorporating these rough-and-ready 
orders of magnitude based on journalistic sources in any calculation of inequality that 
requires ‘adjusting’ the survey data. There is, nevertheless, strong reason to believe—
see Davies (1993) and Davies and Shorrocks (2000)—that such an exercise could be 
suggestive of a more realistic picture of wealth concentration than is afforded by the 
‘uncontaminated’ survey data. With this in mind, we have added the Business Standard   22
2003 wealth data on the richest 178 households to the open-ended class interval of the 
grouped 2002-03 survey data on asset distribution, and re-estimated the General 
Quadratic equation of the Lorenz curve: the asset share of the richest 1 per cent is now 
found to rise from 15.72 per cent to 17.77 per cent. Combining the Business Standard 
data with the survey data suggests that the wealthiest 178 households account for 
0.00009 per cent of all households, and for 2.045 per cent of the country’s estimated 
wealth: the ratio of asset share to population share of the Business Standard’s ultra-
wealthy is a small matter of 23,239. We do not have to accept these numbers at face 
value, but it would seem to be hard to deny that the surveys underestimate the wealth of 
the very rich by a significant margin. 
Inter-household inequality in the distribution of assets: the picture at the state-level 
At the level of individual states, we find that inter-state disparity in inequality levels is 
quite muted when compared to inter-state disparity in average asset-holdings. The 
wealth status of a state can be described in terms of its average level of asset-holding 
and how unequally it is distributed. Letting μ stand for mean asset-holdings per 
household and G for the Gini co-efficient of inequality in the distribution of assets, 
W ≡ μ(1-G) is Sen’s (1976) measure of the ‘distributionally adjusted mean’, and can be 
employed, in the present context, as an ad hoc way of combining information on the 
level (interpreted as a ‘good’) and inequality (interpreted as a ‘bad’) of wealth. In rural 
India, the best-performing state, Punjab, has a W-value of Rs.394,111, and the worst 
performer, Orissa, has a W-value of Rs.41,055, the proportionate difference between the 
two being of the order of 0.8958. In urban India, the best performing state is Kerala, 
with a W-value of Rs.351,374, and the worst-performing state is Orissa, with a W-value 
of Rs.85,475; the proportionate difference between the two is a high 0.7567. The data 
suggest that vertical inequality in the distribution of wealth is generally high for India 
and its states, and higher for some states than for others; and identifiable states like 
Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu labour under the twin burdens of high 
inequality and low average wealth.  
Inter-household inequality in the distribution of net worth 
Net worth, defined as assets less liabilities, is obviously a more accurate indicator of 
wealth than asset-holding. Unfortunately, distributional analysis of net worth based on 
the published data provided by the surveys is not possible because the households are 
ranked by asset-holding rather than by net worth. The availability of unit-level data for 
1991-92 however enables us to examine the distribution of net worth. Using the 1991-
92 microdata, we have ranked households according to net worth, and then classified 
them into the same size classes as are to be found in the published 1991-92 survey, with 
one further size class added. The additional size class relates to households for which 
debt is in excess of asset-holding. At the combined (rural and urban) all-India level, an 
estimated 1.43 million households are reported to have negative net worth. Grouped 
data on cumulative population and net worth shares, derived from the microdata, are   23
presented in Table 8. When a variable (like net worth) assumes negative values, the Gini 
co-efficient can be computed along the lines suggested by Chen et al. (1982). 
 
As we have seen earlier, the debt-asset ratio declines monotonically with the size class 
of asset-holdings. Debt, like taxation, is a drain. Therefore, the distribution of net worth 
when the debt-asset ratio is a declining function of asset size can be expected to be like 
a post-tax income distribution under a regressive tax scheme. It is not surprising, then, 
that the Gini co-efficient for net worth, at 0.6588, is higher than the Gini co-efficient for 
assets, at 0.6436. The actual difference is perhaps larger, because the extent of total 
indebtedness reported by the survey is very small, the aggregate debt-asset ratio being 
just 2.01 per cent. If each household’s debt figure is blown up by the factor (3.15) 
obtained after correction for the under-reported extent of institutional debt along the 
lines discussed earlier in the section on ‘debt’, and if households are reclassified by net 
worth corresponding to these revised debt estimates, then we obtain an ‘adjusted’ net 
worth distribution (see Table 11). The Gini co-efficient for this ‘adjusted’ distribution 
is, as might be expected, higher at 0.6820 than the co-efficient for the unadjusted 
distribution. Our general sense is that the underestimation of both asset-holdings and 
debt in the survey has worked in such a way as to understate the true extent of 
inequality in the distribution of net worth.  
 
Table 8: Co-ordinates of the Lorenz curve for the distribution of net worth: India (rural 
and urban combined) 1991-92 
Size class 
 
Without correcting the debt figure  After correcting the debt figure 
 cumulative 
population share 





in net worth 
<0 0.00907  -0.00086  0.03481  -0.01041 
0-5,000 0.11429  0.00108 0.13912  -0.00839 
5,000-10,000 0.18481 0.00568 0.20825  -0.00369 
10,000-20,000 0.29735  0.02005 0.32070  0.01135 
20,000-30,000 0.38581  0.03917 0.40646  0.03078 
30,000-50,000 0.51733  0.08432 0.53248  0.07590 
50,000-70,000 0.61239  0.13372 0.62633  0.12693 
70,000-1,00,000 0.71035 0.20562  0.72098  0.19958 
1,00,000-1,50,000 0.80408  0.30601  0.81159  0.30114 
1,50,000-2,50,000 0.89459  0.45818  0.89874  0.45419 
≥2,50,000 1.00000  1.00000 1.00000  1.00000 
Gini co-efficient  0.6588  0.6820 
Note: The debt figure is corrected by blowing up each household’s reported debt by the factor by which the 
aggregate debt figure is blown up when corrected for the possible under-estimation of institutional debt, as 
detailed in the section on ‘debt’ in the text. 
Source: Computations based on unit-level data made available by NSSO in CD ROM (marked as 48th 
Round, Schedule 18.2, Debt and Investment). 
 
   24
Inequality decomposition by asset components 
Table 9, based on 1991-92 microdata, provides information on the Gini co-efficient of 
inequality in the inter-household distribution of each asset component, separately for the 
rural and the urban areas. As can be seen from the table, financial assets display an 
extraordinarily high order of concentration, as do agricultural machinery and non-farm 
business equipment, but these assets together account for less than 6 per cent of the 
value of all assets at the combined (rural and urban) all-India level. The Gini co-
efficients for land and buildings are also particularly high in the urban areas, and these 
categories of assets together constitute a weighty part of the asset portfolio, accounting, 
between them, for 82 per cent of the value of all assets. It is these asset components 
which might be expected to drive aggregate inequality, to the decomposition of which 
we now turn.  
Table 9: Inequality in the distribution of asset components: rural and urban India, 1991-92 
Gini co-efficient of inequality   
Asset component  rural urban 
Land   0.7280  0.8265 
Building 0.6094  0.7997 
Livestock and poultry  0.6883  0.9557 
Agricultural machinery  0.9147  0.9885 
Non-farm business equipment  0.9786  0.9677 
All transport equipment  0.8978  0.9209 






  shares 
  deposits  0.9629  0.8730 
Loan receivable in cash  0.9955  0.9960 
Loan receivable in kind  0.9995  0.9995 
Source: See Table 8. 
 
A decomposition rule R is a procedure by which the proportionate contribution of each 
asset component to aggregate inequality can be reckoned, with the proportionate 
contributions adding up to unity. Without further restrictions placed on the rule, the 
door is open to any number of decomposition rules which, in principle, could assess 
component contributions very differently from each other. Shorrocks (1982, 1983) has 
shown that under certain weak and reasonable restrictions, the only decomposition rule 
(which is invariant with respect to which measure is employed for computing 
inequality) that is available, is given by RV: sk = cov(Ak,A)/Var(A), where sk is the 
proportionate contribution to aggregate inequality of the kth asset component, A is the 
distribution for total assets, Ak is the distribution for the kth asset component, cov stands 
for co-variance, and var stands for variance. Shorrocks observes that, as it happens, RV 
is the ‘natural’ decomposition rule for the variance and the squared co-efficient of 
variation: we could therefore call RV the ‘variance rule’.  
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Table 10: Per cent contribution of asset components to total value of assets (c) and to 
aggregate inequality (s) under the ‘variance rule’: India 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92 














1971r                  
c 66.22  18.42  6.46  2.73  NA NA  4.61  1.55  100 
s 74.78  13.4  3.36  3.64  NA NA  2.80  2.02  100 
s/c 1.13  0.73 0.52  1.33  NA NA  0.61  1.30   
1981r                  
c 62.12  20.71  4.98  2.47  0.30 0.96  7.10  1.37  100 
s 71.84  14.71  2.66  4.03  0.32 1.16  4.12  1.16  100 
s/c 1.16  0.71 0.53  1.63  1.07 1.21  0.58  0.85   
1991r                    
c 64.25  21.4  3.38  2.23  0.32 1.21  5.88  1.33  100 
s 74.09  14.29  1.81  3.23  0.25 1.37  3.98  0.98  100 
s/c 1.15  0.67 0.54  1.45  0.78 1.13  0.68  0.74   
2002r                  
c 63.22  23.53  2.10  1.98  0.35 1.39  5.11  2.32  100 
s 73.98  14.83  1.11  2.92  0.30 1.80  2.97  2.10  100 
s/c 1.17  0.63 0.53  1.48  0.85 1.30  0.58  0.91   
1981u                  
c 32.36  35.65  0.83  0.41  2.05 2.51  15.14  11.05  100 
s 40.87  35.67  0.57  0.60  3.16 2.79  7.76  8.59  100 
s/c 1.26  1.00 0.69  1.46  1.54 1.11  0.51  0.78   
1991u                    
c 35.8  39.46  0.42  0.26  1.48 3.03  11.29  8.26  100 
s 38.99  41.55  0.24  0.32  1.58 3.16  7.20  6.96  100 
s/c 1.09  1.05 0.57  1.23  1.07 1.04  0.64  0.84   
2002u                  
c 38.54  37.84  0.21  0.22  1.38 3.85  8.37  9.58  100 
s 42.85  36.71  0.10  0.30  1.53 4.47  5.13  8.91  100 
s/c 1.11  0.97 0.48  1.36  1.10 1.16  0.61  0.93   
Note: ‘r’ stands for ‘rural’ and ‘u’ for ‘urban’. 
Source: See Table 6. 
 
Table 10 presents information, for all survey years under review, on each of the various 
asset components’ proportionate contribution to aggregate inequality in the distribution 
of assets (s) under the decomposition rule RV, and also on each component’s 
contribution to the total value of assets (c). Table 10 reveals considerable stability in the 
decomposition pattern over time. Component contributions to inequality are generally 
consistent with component shares in the total value of assets, with land and buildings 
between them accounting for between three-fourths and four-fifths of all inequality in   26
both the rural and the urban areas: the division is heavily weighted in favour of land in 
rural India and more balanced between the two in urban India. The ratio sk/ck is of 
significance: when it is in excess of unity for any asset component k, the suggestion is 
that asset k has a disequalizing impact on the aggregate distribution which is 
disproportionately greater than its share in the aggregate value of assets. Table 10 
reveals that the s/c ratio is consistently at least equal to one for three categories of assets 
in the rural areas—land, agricultural machinery—and all transport equipment, and for 
four categories of assets in the urban areas—land, agricultural machinery, transport 
equipment—and non-farm business equipment (for buildings, s/c is in excess of unity in 
1981-82 and 1991-92, and falls just short of unity in 2002-03). The component-wise 
decomposition invites attention to those components for which both s and s/c are high. 
By this reckoning, Table 10 signals a simple message: land and buildings between them 
in the urban areas, and land by itself in the rural areas, must be seen to be the major 
driving force behind aggregate inequality in the distribution of assets. This is of a piece 
with what we have seen earlier: the centrality of land in India’s wealth picture is re-
emphasized. 
4 Horizontal  inequality  in  the distribution of assets 
In this section we undertake a review, for 1991-92, of group-related inequality in wealth 
distribution. As noted in Section 2, the grouping is in terms of each of caste and 
occupation, and the 1991-92 survey is distinguished by the fact that it provides 
(a) caste-related information and (b) household-level microdata. We look at two aspects 
of the problem: inequality as it obtains for each group, and a decomposition of 
aggregate inequality into its ‘within-group’ and ‘between-group’ components. Table 4, 
and Tables 11A-11D, are relevant for these exercises. 
4.1  Group-wise inequalities and distributionally adjusted wealth levels 
Table 11A provides information on average asset-holdings per household, the Gini co-
efficient of inequality, and the Theil index of inequality, separately for all households, 
scheduled castes and tribes (SCST) households, and ‘others’ households, for rural India 
in 1991-92. Table 11B provides the same information for urban India. Tables 11C and 
11D relate to occupational category: the former provides information on average assets 
per household, Gini, and Theil, separately for all households, cultivator (C ) households, 
and non-cultivator (NC) households, for rural India; and the latter provides the same 
information for self-employed (SE) households and non-self-employed (NSE) 
households, for urban India. We consider caste first. In the rural as well as in the urban 
areas, mean asset-holdings per household are systematically and substantially higher for 
the ‘Others’ group than for the SCST group. For the rural areas, in the majority of states 
(as in India as a whole) Gini for the ‘others’ is greater than Gini for the SCST, although 
there are instances of rank-reversal by the Theil index; for the urban areas, the rankings 
by Gini and Theil are identical, and again in a majority of states inequality (as measured 
by either index) for the ‘others’ exceeds that for the SCST.   27
Table 11A: Mean asset-holdings, inequality, and inequality decomposition: scheduled castes and tribes, and ‘others’, rural India and states, 
1991-92 
   India  AP  Assam  Bihar  Gujarat Haryana  Karnataka Kerala MP  Maharastra Orissa  Punjab  Rajasthan TN  UP  WB 
all  107007 58175 60092  97899 102939 337641 107149  181535  93061 92892  45730  328663 158809  61979  139233 61881 
others  134501 72744  61491  119330 123954 425241  123538  198761  129413 115768  63373 474913 198892  78549 166055 74769 
Assets per 
household 
SCST  50363  27931 53618  45801 56478 89943  58313  45012 52900 42500  30392  90358 88606  27690  66817 40361 
all  0.6207  0.6491 0.4919  0.6130 0.5421 0.5142  0.5513  0.5489 0.6093 0.6057  0.5519 0.5639 0.5387  0.6543 0.5573 0.5701 
others  0.5954  0.6323 0.5019  0.5862 0.5184 0.4341  0.5446  0.5262 0.5763 0.5744  0.5297 0.4317 0.5108  0.6288 0.5310 0.5546 
Gini co-efficient of 
inequality 
SCST  0.5707  0.5956 0.4360  0.5729 0.5006 0.5968  0.4697  0.4185 0.5730 0.5771  0.5160 0.5683 0.5045  0.6065 0.5185 0.5482 
all  0.7123  0.8051 0.4142  0.6838 0.5216 0.5226  0.5452  0.5360 0.6848 0.6618  0.5558 0.6258 0.5205  0.8155 0.5528 0.5735 
others  0.6410  0.7458 0.4305  0.6095 0.4663 0.3946  0.5271  0.4918 0.5929 0.5851  0.4939 0.4119 0.4672  0.7310 0.4963 0.5331 
Theil Index of 
inequality 
SCST  0.6079  0.6518 0.3324  0.6626 0.4856 0.6570  0.3728  0.3059 0.6133 0.5930  0.4868 0.6399 0.4574  0.7333 0.4882 0.5420 
among  others 76.12  78.21 86.07  76.98 74.32 70.25  83.46  89.21 63.18 75.77  57.28  58.94 71.55  76.59  77.98 70.23 
among  SCST  13.10  12.61 13.51  13.21 15.67 8.78  9.35  1.59  24.13 12.78  31.09  10.69 17.82  13.09  11.42 23.06 
% contribution to 
aggregate Theil of 
Inequality  between  groups  10.78  9.18  0.41  9.81  10.01 20.96  7.19  9.20  12.68 11.45  11.63  30.37 10.62  10.32  10.60 6.71 
Note: SCST stands for ‘scheduled castes and scheduled tribes’. 
Source: calculations based on data in NSSO (1998) 48th Round.   28
Table 11B: Mean asset-holdings, inequality, and inequality decomposition: scheduled castes and tribes, and ‘others’, urban India and states, 
1991-92 
   India  AP  Assam  Bihar  Gujarat  Haryana KarnatakaKerala MP  Maharastra Orissa Punjab  Rajasthan TN  UP  WB 
all  144330  94813  112184 98958  160047 151211 125123  221524 117340 165151  72338  255702 161044  119614  157542 101116 
others  159746  105019 115341 104683 174592 169486 134965  232685 139939 181578  92806  292328 185288  132141  170743 109678 
Assets per 
household 
SCST  58873  31889 76311 64980 68415 58264 56156  40933 48535 66694  23291 84262 51532  42180  85189  55729 
all  0.6805  0.7145 0.6847 0.6181 0.6274 0.6238 0.6774  0.5256 0.6660 0.7056  0.7123 0.5841 0.6275  0.7387  0.6493  0.6545 
others  0.6695  0.7009 0.6792 0.6244 0.6097 0.6147 0.6728  0.5080 0.6463 0.7012  0.6901 0.5594 0.6010  0.7286  0.6371  0.6458 
Gini co-efficient 
of inequality 
SCST  0.6466  0.5936 0.7132 0.5250 0.5972 0.3840 0.6039  0.5694 0.6174 0.5652  0.5811 0.5312 0.5333  0.6999  0.6714  0.6640 
all  0.8810  0.9918 0.8990 0.7112 0.7228 0.7168 0.8616  0.5157 0.8309 0.9853  1.0088 0.6442 0.7259  1.0847  0.7945  0.7853 
others  0.8480  0.9421 0.8769 0.7269 0.6796 0.6940 0.8478  0.4845 0.7730 0.9670  0.9188 0.5997 0.6698  1.0457  0.7585  0.7630 
Theil index of 
inequality 
SCST  0.7898  0.6871 1.2422 0.4715 0.6467 0.2986 0.6649  0.6116 0.6887 0.6329  0.6222 0.4914 0.5121  0.9575  0.9265  0.8015 
among 
others 
89.86  91.78 92.08 92.52 85.14 91.06 92.86  92.95 83.53 92.56  82.38 87.68 86.93  91.71  87.50  88.67 
among 
SCST 
5.58  2.29 7.75 6.28 6.43 2.22 4.33  1.28 8.47 3.65  5.87 4.43 4.09  4.29  9.67  8.76 





4.56  5.94 0.17 1.20 8.43 6.72 2.81  5.77 8.00 3.79  11.75  7.89 8.98  4.00  2.84  2.57 
Note: SCST stands for scheduled castes and tribes. 
Source: See Table 11A.   29
Table 11C: Mean asset-holdings, inequality, and inequality decomposition: cultivators and non-cultivators, rural India and states, 1991-92 
   India  AP  Assam Bihar  Gujarat Haryana  Karnataka  Kerala MP  Maharastra Orissa Punjab  Rajasthan TN  UP  WB 
all  107007  58175  60092  97899 102939 337641 107149  181535  93061 92892  45730  328663 158809  61979 139233 61881 
cultivator 142308  89964  73008  127068 141865 544634  136545  212893  118171 133087  54911  614888 182901  103384 164570 81955  Assets per household 
non-cultivator 38180 18109  27390  30641 43671 59724  40668  69293 32071 30776  25797  106359 60079  29661 57408 24298 
all  0.6207 0.6491 0.4919 0.6130 0.5421 0.5142  0.5513  0.5489 0.6093 0.6057  0.5519 0.5639 0.5387  0.6543 0.5573 0.5701 
cultivator  0.5545 0.5563 0.4350 0.5448 0.4704 0.2769  0.4876  0.4978 0.5563 0.5043  0.5066 0.2824 0.5000  0.5721 0.5147 0.4929 
Gini co-efficient of 
Inequality 
non-cultivator  0.6463 0.6128 0.5328 0.6368 0.5184 0.4965  0.5834  0.6388 0.6224 0.6661  0.6138 0.6120 0.6183  0.6354 0.6005 0.5969 
all  0.7123 0.8051 0.4142 0.6838 0.5216 0.5226  0.5452  0.5360 0.6848 0.6618  0.5558 0.6258 0.5205  0.8155 0.5528 0.5735 
cultivator  0.5521 0.5661 0.3214 0.5253 0.3814 0.1974  0.4199  0.4376 0.5588 0.4440  0.4665 0.2221 0.4455  0.5904 0.4656 0.4180  Theil index of inequality
non-cultivator  0.8382 0.7408 0.5153 0.8739 0.4875 0.4457  0.6257  0.8308 0.7517 0.8907  0.7023 0.7665 0.6945  0.7875 0.7001 0.7163 
among 
cultivators 
68.13 60.64  67.57  69.54 60.83 34.92  68.06  74.84 73.40 57.89  69.02  29.02 79.24  52.94 76.01 62.93 
among non-
cultivators 
14.23 12.67  16.06  12.10 15.71 6.44  13.35  12.92 11.03 17.74  22.47  22.31 9.90  25.95 12.35 17.08 
% contribution to 




17.63 26.69  16.37  18.36 23.45 58.64  18.59  12.24 15.56 24.38  8.51 48.67 10.86  21.11 11.65 20.00 
Source: See Table 11A.   30
Table 11D: Mean asset-holdings, inequality, and inequality decomposition: self-employed and non-self-employed, urban India and states, 1991-92 
    India  AP  Assam  Bihar  Gujarat Haryana Karnataka  Kerala MP  Maharastra Orissa  Punjab  Rajasthan  TN  UP  WB 
all  144330 94813  112184 98958 160047 151211  125123  221524 117340  165151  72338 255702 161044  119614 157542 101116 
se  189710 115401 152306 97814 204391 186837  204048  275476 195868  263192  84495 328101 212947  166845 173684 110785  Assets per household 
nse  120928 84614  84715  99599 136629 120894  92631  193173 85166  125015  66521 200882 132977  100687 142705 96255 
all  0.6805 0.7145 0.6847 0.6181  0.6274 0.6238  0.6774  0.5256 0.6660  0.7056  0.7123  0.5841 0.6275  0.7387 0.6493 0.6545 
se  0.6410 0.7258 0.6743 0.6301  0.6020 0.5227  0.5916  0.4573 0.6073  0.6646  0.7567  0.4961 0.5483  0.7109 0.5773 0.6515 
Gini co-efficient of 
inequality 
nse  0.6962 0.7061 0.6769 0.6087  0.6352 0.7027  0.6936  0.5578 0.6585  0.7011  0.6830  0.6452 0.6681  0.7485 0.7128 0.6557 
all  0.8810 0.9918 0.8990 0.7112  0.7228 0.7168  0.8616  0.5157 0.8309  0.9853  1.0088  0.6442 0.7259  1.0847 0.7945 0.7853 
se  0.7713 1.0473 0.8774 0.7352  0.6689 0.4834  0.6439  0.4045 0.6823  0.8675  1.2113  0.4734 0.5516  0.9919 0.5944 0.7775  Theil index of inequality
nse  0.9296 0.9541 0.8625 0.6977  0.7372 0.9879  0.9191  0.5741 0.8155  0.9729  0.8760  0.7894 0.8337  1.1196 1.0086 0.7861 
among self-
employed 
39.13 41.62 52.94 39.83  40.78 38.57  35.54  33.59 39.84  40.73  45.32  40.68 35.10  36.24 39.50 36.27 
among non-
self-employed 
58.20 57.68 43.35 60.14  57.02 59.06  55.94  63.67 50.53  53.05  54.04  54.71 61.23  61.59 59.88 63.44 
% contribution to 




2.67 0.71 3.73 0.03  2.19 2.37  8.52  2.74 9.63  6.23  0.64  4.63 3.67  2.18 0.61 0.29 
Note: ‘se’ stands for self-employed, and ‘nsestands for non-self-employed 
Source: See Table 11A. 
 
 
   31
We consider occupational groupings next. In the rural areas, cultivator households, on 
average, are much wealthier than non-cultivator households. Further, for the country as 
a whole and in every single state, inequality—whether it is measured by the Gini or the 
Theil index—is systematically greater for the non-cultivator households than for the 
cultivator households. Urban data on self-employed and non-self-employed households 
(Table 11D) reveal that, with the exception of Bihar, the average asset-holdings of the 
SE group is higher than that of the NSE group, though the margin of difference is not as 
pronounced as that between SCST and ‘others’ groups or as that between cultivator and 
non-cultivator groups. As in the case of non-cultivators, the NSE group, which is on 
average poorer than the SE group, also displays greater inequality in a majority of the 
states—in 12 out of 15 according to the Gini co-efficient, and in 11 according to the 
Theil index. 
 
As we have noted earlier, the overall wealth status of a group can be seen as an 
increasing function of its level and a declining function of the extent of inequality in its 
distribution. Sen’s ‘distributionally adjusted mean’, W ≡ μ(1-G), where μ is mean asset-
holdings per household and G is the Gini co-efficient of inequality, can be employed as 
an ad hoc way of combining information on the level and inequality of wealth with a 
view to conveying a summary picture of how well or badly a group is performing on the 
wealth front. The gulf in wealth status (in terms of Sen’s index) which separates 
identifiable sub-groups of the population is captured in a stark and summary form in 
Table 12. Table 12 presents the values of μ, G and W for each pair of polar cases of 
grouping by caste and by occupational category, in each of the rural and the urban areas, 
and the last column measures the proportional difference in ‘wealth-related welfare’ 
between the best-off and the worst-off groups. The gulf in each case is enormous, and 
the gap between rural Punjabi cultivators and rural Andhra Pradesh non-cultivators is as 
close to the theoretical maximum as makes no difference. 
Table 12: Differences in ‘distributionally adjusted’ levels of wealth between best and 










AP, SCST  27,931  0.5956  11,295  Rural polarization by 
caste  Punjab, others 474,913  0.4317  269,893 
0.9582 
Orissa, SCST  23,291  0.5811  9,757  Urban polarization by 
caste  Punjab, others 292,328  0.5594  128,800 
0.9242 
AP, nc  18,109  0.6128  7,012  Rural polarization by 
occupation  Punjab, c   614,888  0.2824  441,244 
0.9841 
Orissa, nse  66,521  0.6830  21,087  Urban polarization by 
occupation  Punjab, se  328,101  0.4961  165,330 
0.8725 
Note: μ stands for mean asset-holdings per household; g for the gini co-efficient of inequality; SCST for 
scheduled castes and tribes; nc for non-cultivators; c for cultivators; se for self-employed; and nse for 
non-self-employed. 
Source: See Table 11A.   32
A finer partitioning of the population is rendered possible by employing the 1991-92 
microdata, which facilitate a caste-cum-occupation categorization. We have three 
castes: scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, and ‘others’; and four occupation groups: 
agricultural labourers, artisans, cultivators, and ‘other labourers’ in the rural areas, and 
casual labourers, self employed, regular/salaried employees, and ‘other labourers’ in the 
urban areas. In combination, these castes and occupations yield 12 groups for the rural 
areas which can be derived from the cartesian product {scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, 
‘others’}  × {agricultural labourers, artisans, cultivators, ‘other labourers’}, and 
similarly 12 groups for the urban areas derived from the cartesian product {scheduled 
caste, scheduled tribe, ‘others’} × {casual labourers, self employed, regular/salaried 
employees, ‘other labourers’}. We do not present the detailed calculations here, but 
simply note that in any given occupational category, the worst-off caste groups are 
either the scheduled castes or the scheduled tribes, while in any given caste category, 
the worst off occupational groups are the agricultural labourers in the rural areas and the 
casual labourers in the urban areas. The proportionate difference between best and worst 
performing caste-cum-occupation groups, in terms of Sen’s ‘distributionally adjusted 
mean’ indicator W, also turns out to be huge (in excess of 90 per cent in the both the 
rural and the urban areas). Group differentiation by wealth in India is clearly massive. 
4.2  Within- and between-group inequality 
An inequality index is sub-group decomposable when it can be expressed as a sum of 
two components: a between-group component (obtained by imagining that within each 
sub-group asset ownership is equally distributed at the level of the sub-group mean), 
and a within-group component (which is a weighted sum of sub-group inequality levels, 
with the weights, typically, being some combination of sub-group population and asset 
shares). The class of decomposable inequality indices is constituted by the so-called 
Generalized Entropy Measures (see Shorrocks 1988), of which the Theil index is a 
member. The proportionate contributions of within- and between-group inequalities to 
aggregate inequality as measured by the Theil index are furnished in the final rows of 
Tables 11A-D. 
 
The relevant numbers in Tables 11A and 11B suggest the following. For rural India as a 
whole, the between-group contribution is relatively small, at 10.8 per cent, and it is 
sizeable in only two states, Haryana (21 per cent) and Punjab (30 per cent). For the 
urban areas, the between-group contribution is systematically and considerably lower 
than in the rural areas, for the country as a whole (4.6 per cent), and for every state 
except Orissa. In a decomposition by occupational category (Tables 11C and 11D), we 
find that in the rural areas the between-group contribution is appreciably higher than it 
is for the caste decomposition: at the all-India rural level, it is 17.6 per cent, and ranges 
from 8.5 per cent in Orissa to a high 48.7 per cent in Punjab. It may be noted that 
Punjab, which displays a high between-group contribution in the decomposition by both 
caste and occupation in the rural areas, also has a relatively large population share of 
SCSTs (38 per cent) and of non-cultivators (56 per cent). In the urban areas, where the   33
occupational grouping is in terms of the self-employed and the non-self-employed, the 
between-group contribution is very low: 2.7 per cent for the country as a whole, and 
ranging between 0.29 per cent (West Bengal) and 9.6 per cent (Madhya Pradesh).  
 
For the country as a whole, and in three of the four cases of decomposition considered, 
it turns out that the largest contribution to aggregate inequality is the within-group 
inequality of the better-off group: thus the contribution of the ‘Others’ caste group is 76 
per cent for rural India and nearly 90 per cent for urban India, while the contribution of 
the cultivators group in rural India is 68 per cent; it is only in the case of occupational 
categorization in the urban areas that the worse-off (non-self-employed) group has a 
dominant within-group contribution (of 58 per cent) to overall inequality. 
 
These are positive results, and they do not warrant the normative inference that reducing 
between-group inequality is a relatively unimportant matter. Such an inference is 
somewhat crudely ‘contribution-oriented’ in motivation, in the sense that it is not overly 
informed by a sense of the intrinsic unfairness of group disparity, but rather by a sense 
of how much group disparity contributes to aggregate inequality. It is often enough 
advanced as a justification of the status quo ante by the better-off and politically 
powerful groups in a society. All too frequently, however, the ‘contribution-consistent’ 
view that the within-group inequality of the dominant group needs urgent rectification is 
simply (and conveniently) overlooked. Inter-group inequality merits attention for 
reasons which are of salience from an intrinsically ethical, and political, perspective. 
That there is plenty of reason to be concerned with such a perspective has already been 
established by the findings, in the preceding sub-section, on the extent of group 
differentiation that obtains in the distribution of wealth in India.  
5  Summary and conclusions 
This study started out with the proposition that the level and distribution of assets are an 
important determinant of the success or failure of entitlements. This is borne out on the 
ground in an important empirical study, by Jain et al. (1989), on the determinants of 
poverty in India. In a cross-sectional analysis of 56 regions of the country for 1971-72, 
employing National Sample Survey data, the authors have attempted to explain the 
inter-regional variations in levels of living and poverty. Their major finding is that, at 
the margin, mean asset security has a greater impact on poverty than even agricultural 
performance. 
 
In developing countries like India, with a preponderantly rural population, land is the 
single most important component of the asset portfolio. The composition and 
distribution of assets, with particular emphasis on the land component, and their role in 
the ‘dynamics of rural transformation’, have been studied by Kurien (1989) in the 
context of the state of Tamil Nadu. His analysis of agricultural production, technology, 
and the household distribution of assets by land ownership suggests that while   34
agricultural technology is largely scale-neutral, its benefits are unequally distributed in 
favour of the larger landowners on account of their superior ability to take advantage of 
the complementarities of modern inputs, implements and machinery, and farm 
processes. Janakarajan’s (1992) field work on Tamil Nadu shows that improved 
irrigation, technology, high yielding crop varieties, and the availability of credit have all 
contributed considerably to a dynamic growth of agricultural output in the State, but 
inequalities in the distribution of both land and access to private (lift) irrigation have 
played a large part in preserving feudal social relations of dependence and oppression 
even in an environment of modernizing, ‘capitalist’ forces of production in agriculture. 
 
Given the centrality of land in the asset structure of rural India and of other developing 
countries, and its driving force in precipitating inequalities in the distribution of assets, 
one would imagine that land reform must constitute an important component of anti-
poverty policy. Implementation of land reform has often been compromised by both the 
political power of ‘land-lobbies’ and that aspect of ideological orientation which insists 
on seeing equity as endangering efficiency. Increasingly, however, the conservatism 
underlying such positions has been undermined by a number of careful empirical 
studies. Bandyopadhyay (2003) provides an instructive account of the role of land 
reform in explaining agricultural growth and poverty reduction in the state of West 
Bengal. The Indian experience, employing state-level data, has been analyzed by Besley 
and Burgess (2000), who conclude that of the four components of land reform policy in 
India, two (tenancy reform and abolition of intermediaries) have had a depressing effect 
on poverty, while the other two (land redistribution and land consolidation) have been 
very poorly implemented: ‘Although the effects on poverty are likely to have been 
greater if large-scale redistribution of land had been achieved, our results are 
nonetheless interesting as they suggest that partial, second-best reforms which mainly 
affect production relations in agriculture can play a significant role in reducing rural 
poverty’ (p.424). Similarly optimistic appraisals are available for South Africa in the 
study by Deininger and May (2000), who say: ‘The good news is that the data on land 
reform implementation provide strong support in favour of the hypothesis that land 
reform was able to target the poor and that there is little difficulty in combining equity 
and efficiency objectives.’ Deininger et al. (2000) present the case of the contribution of 
land reform to economic growth and poverty reduction in Zimbabwe, a study in which 
they cite a number of other cases of success, reported by other authors, relating to Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brazil, and Colombia. 
 
Against this background, we have outlined (in Section 1) the importance of a study of 
India’s wealth statistics for an understanding of the structural features of the country’s 
economy, and for being guided in the formulation and implementation of pro-egalitarian 
and anti-poverty policy. Section 2 has reviewed the contents of the principal source of 
India’s wealth distributions statistics, which is constituted by the five major decennial 
sample surveys of 1961-62, 1971-72, 1981-82, 1991-92 and 2002-03. A number of 
difficulties confronting the user of these data have been discussed, in a non-nihilistic   35
spirit, in the paper by Subramanian and Jayaraj (2006), on parts of which the present 
paper relies. One has to allow for the strong possibility that both the level and inequality 
in the distribution of asset-holdings are increasingly understated over time in the 
surveys. This problem is so much a function of the general environment of untruthful 
voluntary disclosure that it would amount largely to token exhortation if one were to 
urge more accurate reporting by the surveys, although there is a case for some internal 
cross-checking in the matter, for example, of land operations. The construction of 
wealth statistics must also be accompanied, importantly, by the construction of 
appropriate asset-specific prices, so that meaningful real comparisons, in both cross-
section and time-series exercises, are rendered possible. Thirdly, for a number of 
reasons, it would greatly enhance both freedom and accuracy of analysis if the survey 
results were available in the form of unit record data, an outcome which presently 
obtains only for 1991-92. This would call for discussions between the data-generating 
agency and data-users on how best the data may be arranged and computerized, with a 
considerable measure of urgency attached to the process.  
 
Section 3 has presented some salient findings (subject to the data limitations earlier 
discussed) from the five wealth surveys. Levels of debt, levels of asset-holdings across 
space and over time, the composition of wealth, vertical inequalities in its distribution, 
decomposition of inequality by asset components, and questions of horizontal 
inequalities, in terms of the highly skewed distribution across caste and occupation 
groups, have been investigated. The general picture which emerges is one of 
considerable concentration of wealth both vertically and horizontally, considerable 
inter-state differentials, and the continuing centrality of land and real estate in the 
wealth composition of the country. These findings only underscore the importance of 
land-reform, especially its re-distributive component, as a policy instrument for the cure 
of deeply entrenched structural inequality and poverty—an issue of centrality which has 
got lost in a regrettable policy mix of neglect, political unpreparedness, and denial. 
Principal data sources employed  
Census of India (2001). Tables H-13, H-13 SC and H-13 ST (number of households 
availing banking services and number of households having each of the specified 
assets) accessed on CD Rom.  
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (1993). Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian 
Economy (August 1993), Vol.1, Bombay. 
Ministry of Agriculture (1998). All-India Report on Agricultural Census, 1990-91, 
Department of Agriculture and Co-operation, Government of India: New Delhi. 
NCAER (National Council of Applied Economic Research) (2000). Survey of Indian 
Investors, NCAER: New Delhi.   36
NSSO (National Sample Survey Organization) (1968). Tables with Notes on Some 
Aspects of Landholdings in Rural Areas (State and All-India Estimates), 17th Round, 
September 1961-July 1962, Report No.144, Department of Statistics, Government of 
India, New Delhi. 
NSSO (1976). Tables on Land Holdings: All-India, 26th Round, Report No.215, 
Department of Statistics, Government of India, New Delhi. 
NSSO (1985). Assets and Liabilities of Rural and Urban Households (States and All-
India Estimates), 37th Round, January-December 1982, Report No.318, Department 
of Statistics, Government of India: New Delhi. 
NSSO (1986). Report on Landholdings-1: Some Aspects of Household Ownership 
Holding, 37th Round, January-December 1982, Report No.330, Department of 
Statistics, Government of India: New Delhi. 
NSSO (1986). Report on Landholdings-2: Some Aspects of  Operational Holdings, 37th 
Round, January-December 1982, Report No.331, Department of Statistics, 
Government of India: New Delhi. 
NSSO (1996). Land Holdings Survey: Some Aspects of Household Ownership Holdings, 
48th Round, January-December 1992, Report No.399, Department of Statistics, 
Government of India: New Delhi.  
NSSO (1997). Land and Livestock Holdings Survey: Operational Land Holdings in 
India, 1991-92—Salient Features (Report 2), 48th Round, January-December 1992, 
Report No.407, Department of Statistics, Government of India: New Delhi. 
NSSO (1998). Debt and Investment Survey: Household Assets and Liabilities as on 
30.6.1991, 48th Round, January-December 1992, Report No.419. Department of 
Statistics, Government of India: New Delhi.   
NSSO (1998). Household Assets and Indebtedness of Social Groups as on 30.6.91, Debt 
and Investment Survey, 48th Round, January-December 1992, Report No.432 (Part 
I). Department of Statistics, Government of India: New Delhi. 
NSSO (2005). Household Assets and Liabilities in India (as on 30.06.2002), Report 
No.500 (based on data of the 59th Round (January-December 2003) All-India Debt 
and Investment Survey). Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 
Government of India: New Delhi.  
Reserve Bank of India (1965). ‘All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey’, Reserve 
Bank of India Bulletin 19(6) June. 
Reserve Bank of India (1975). All-India Debt and Investment Survey 1971-72: Assets 
and Liabilities of Rural Households as on 31st June 1971 (Statistical Tables) Vol.1, 
Reserve Bank of India: Bombay. 
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